Introduction
In this chapter we present a "history-friendly" model of the evolution of the pharmaceutical industry. This industry constitutes an ideal subject for history-friendly analysis, for several reasons and especially in comparison to our previous efforts concerning the computer industry.
Pharmaceuticals are traditionally a highly R&D and marketing intensive sector, which has undergone a series of radical technological and institutional "shocks". However, the core of leading innovative firms and countries has remained quite small and stable for a very long period of time, but -differently from computers -the degree of concentration has been consistently low, whatever the level of aggregation is considered.
We argue that the observed patterns of the evolutionary dynamics were related to the following main factors:
a) The nature of the processes of drug discovery, i.e. to the properties of the space of technological opportunities and of the search procedures through which firms explore it.
Specifically, innovation processes have been characterized for a very long time by low degree of cumulativeness and by "quasi-random" procedures of search (random screening). Thus, innovation in one market (a therapeutic category) does not entail much higher probabilities of success in another one.
b) The fragmented nature of the relevant markets. Pharmaceuticals are actually composed by a large number of independent submarkets (therapeutic categories): for example, cardiovascular products do not compete with antidepressants. And, given the "quasi-random" nature of the innovative processes, innovation in one therapeutic category bears little consequences on the ability to innovate in another market.
c) The type of competition and the role of patents. In pharmaceuticals patents are a fundamental appropriability device. They confer temporary monopoly power to the innovator but competition remains strong through processes of "inventing around" and -after patent expiryimitation.
Relevant Historical Features of the Evolution of the Pharmaceutical Industry
The historical evolution of the pharmaceutical industry is customarily divided in three major eras 1 . Up to the mid of the 20 th century, the industry was not characterized by intensive R&D: few 4 synthesising variants of compounds that had already shown promising effects in a screen, but that might not be ideally suited to be a drug. Any given compound might have unacceptable side effects, for example, or be very difficult to administer. The "design" of new compounds was a slow, painstaking process that drew heavily on skills in analytic and medicinal chemistry. Several important classes of drugs were discovered in this way, including most of the important diuretics, many of the most widely used psychoactive drugs and several powerful antibiotics. While chemists working within this regime often had some intuitive sense of the links between any given chemical structure and its therapeutic effect, little of this knowledge was codified, so that new compound "design" was driven as much by the skills of individual chemists as it was by a basis of systematic science.
Random screening worked extremely well for many years. Several hundred new chemical entities (NCEs) were introduced in the 1950s and 1960s and several important classes of drug were discovered in this way. However, the successful introduction of NCEs has to be considered as a quite rare event. Indeed, estimates suggest that, out of all new compounds that were discovered only one over 5,000 reached the market.
Despite the massive investments in R&D and marketing efforts of firms, the industry did not experience a significant rise in the degree of concentration 3 . Almost since its start, market structure was characterized by a stable core of leading firms and a large fringe of smaller companies. Patent protection granted temporary monopoly power to innovative companies, but no dominant positions on the global market emerged. Competition during this era extensively relied on the introduction of new products, but also on the incremental refinements of existing drugs, as well as on imitation of drugs whose patent protection expired. Many firms did not specialize in R&D and innovation, but rather in imitation/inventing around, as well as in the production and marketing of products often invented elsewhere. This group of firms included companies like Bristol-Myers, Warner-Lambert, Plough, American Home Products, as well as almost all of the firms in countries like France, Italy, Spain and Japan. The "oligopolistic core" of the industry has been composed of the early innovative Swiss and German firms, joined after World War II by a few American and British entrants, all of which maintained over time an innovation-oriented strategy. Many of the leading firms during this period -companies such as Roche, Ciba, Hoechst, Merck, Pfizer, and Lilly -had their origins in the "pre-R&D" era of the industry. Price competition was also intense: usually mark-ups were lower that 5%.
The 70s represented another turning point for the evolution of the pharmaceutical industry.
Progresses in pharmacology, physiology, enzymology, biology leaded to a deeper knowledge about the understanding of the mechanisms of action of drugs as well as of the diseases. In turn, this advances opened up the way for new techniques of searching, that have been named "guided search" and "rational drug design", that made possible to the researchers to design compounds with specific therapeutic effects. Also the way in which the compounds were screened changed substantially. The transition from random to guided search was still underway when advances in DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) technologies and molecular genetics introduces a radical transformation in the knowledge base of the industry. The "biotechnological revolution" had a deep influence on the industrial structure. The required competencies for drug discovery and the development process were profoundly affected by the advent of biotechnology, and the existing firms had to face this transformation. It is not the aim of this chapter to study the advent of biotechnology. For our purposes, it suffices to say that the applications of biotechnology to pharmaceuticals deeply transformed the industry. A significant process of entry of new firms was observed for the first time after the Second World War 4 . However, the new entrants did not displace the incumbents. Rather, a dense web of collaborative relationships and a market for technology developed among large incumbents and new biotechnology companies.
Throughout its history, the industry has been characterized by relatively low levels of concentration, especially when compared to other R&D and marketing intensive industries. Up until the mid-Nineties, no firm had a worldwide market share larger than 4.5%: the market shares of the top twenty firms 5 ranged in 1996 from 1.3 to 4.4 percent. The CR4 index 6 in 1994 was equal to 16.1 percent.
This picture looks somewhat different, however, at the level of the individual sub-markets like e.g. cardiovascular, diuretics, tranquilizers, etc. Despite stability in the aggregate industrial structure, pharmaceuticals is actually a series of fragmented, independent markets. The largest firms held dominant positions in individual therapeutic categories (TCs). In some TC, the CR4 index was above 80 percent in 1995 7 , and in many others only two or three drugs account for more than 50 percent of the market sales 8 . These firms also represented the most active firms in terms of innovative output (measured by the introduction of NCE, new chemical entities, in the market). Yet, even in sub-markets, dominant positions were often temporary and contestable.
Innovative new drugs arrived quite rarely but after the arrival they experienced extremely high rates of market growth. Firms could have temporary monopolies on NCE through patents.
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Indeed, pharmaceuticals has historically been one of the few industries where patents provide solid protection against imitation (Klevorick et al. 1982) 9 . In turn, this entailed a highly skewed distribution of the returns on innovation and of product market sizes as well as of the intra-firm distribution of sales across products. So a few `blockbusters' dominated the product range of all major firms (Matraves, 1999, p.180; Sutton, 1998) . However, entirely new products (New Chemical Entities) only capture a part of innovative activities, even in this second epoch. "Inventing-around" existing molecules, or introducing new combinations among them, or new ways of delivering them, etc., constituted a major component of firms' innovative activities broadly defined. Thus, while market competition centered around new product introductions, firms also competed through incremental advances over time, as well as imitation and generic competition after patent expiration. This latter in particular allowed a large "fringe" of firms to thrive through commodity production and development of licensed products.
Over the last decade concentration has been increasing, despite the entry of the new biotechnology firms and the expansion of the generic segment of the industry. Various explanations have been suggested for this trend. Costs of both discovery and development of new drugs have sharply increased, and at the same time the productivity of research has been falling, despite the new opportunities opened by biotechnology. Tighter regulation is often blamed for rising costs and dwindling productivity. There is little doubt that expanded numbers of trials, patents and procedures to meet regulatory requirements have significantly contributed to the increased costs and time of product development. Yet, substantial progress has also been achieved in shortening development times on the regulatory side, particularly for specific classes of drugs. According to other explanations the decline in productivity could be the outcome of an intrinsic difficulty in discovering new drugs for increasingly complex pathologies: the low hanging fruits have already been picked and now the challenge becomes harder. And the new scientific knowledge created by the molecular biology revolution has not, in fact, increased the observed productivity of R&D because of the inability of drug firms to keep pace with the increased intrinsic complexity of the biochemical problems that innovative search is addressing (Nightingale and Mahdi (2006) .
Economies of scale and scope in R&D and marketing may also have become more important, according to some studies (Cockburn and Henderson (1994), Nightingale (2004) . In any case, the growth of concentration has been mainly the consequence of processes and mergers and 9 Note, however, that the scope and efficacy of patent protection has varied significantly across countries. The U.S have provided relatively strong patent protection in pharmaceuticals.
However, in many other European countries, did not offer protection for pharmaceutical products: only process technologies could be patented. France introduced product patents in 1960 , Germany 1968 , Japan 1976 , Switzerland 1977 , Italy and Sweden in 1978 In some cases, as in Japan and Italy (and possibly France) the absence of product patent protection induced firms to avoid product R&D and to concentrate instead on finding novel processes for making existing molecules. In other cases, primarily Germany and Switzerland, this negative effect didn't happen acquisitions 10 . Yet, in 2004, the largest pharmaceutical firm (Pfizer) held a world market share close to 10% and the CR5 concentration ratio was around 1/3 in the US and in the EU, i.e. still denoting relatively low concentration.
In sum, the thrust of the story that we want to model can be summarised as follows. A number of firms competes to discover, develop and market new drugs for a large variety of diseases. They face a large space of -at the beginning -unexplored opportunities. However, the search for new promising compounds is essentially random, because the knowledge of why a certain molecule can "cure" a particular disease and of where that particular molecule can be found is limited. That is to say, the role of "science" here is modest. Thus, firm explore randomly the "space of molecules" until they find one which might become a useful drug and patent it. The patent provides protection from imitation for a certain amount of time and over a given range of "similar" molecules. After discovery, firms engage in the development of the drug, without knowing how difficult, time consuming and costly the process will be and what the quality of the new drug will be. Then, the drug is sold on the market, whose notional size is defined by the number of potential patients and by its "natural" rate of growth. Marketing expenditures allow firms to increase the number of patients they can access. At the beginning, the new drug is the only product available on that particular therapeutic class. But other firms can discover competing drugs or imitate. Indeed, firms are characterised by different propensities towards innovation on the one hand and imitation and marketing on the other. The innovator will therefore experience a burst of growth following the introduction of the new drug, but later on its revenues and market shares will be eroded away by competitors and imitators.
The discovery of a drug in a particular therapeutic class does not entail any advantage in the discovery of another drug in a different class (market) -except for the volume of profits they can reinvest in search and development. Moreover, the various sub-markets (therapeutic categories) that define the overall pharmaceutical industry are independent from one another also on the demand side: an anti-ulcer drug is useless for a patient suffering Alzheimer. As a consequence, diversification into different therapeutic categories is also purely random. Hence, firms will start 10 The reasons that are typically suggested for this wave of M&As reflect indeed the basic explanations mentioned above. First, the rising costs of R&D and marketing imply larger markets and rationalization of the portfolio of R&D projects and of products. Given the enormous amount of resources needed to bring a drug to the market and to sustain it afterwards, only very large organizations can engage in these efforts. Second, mergers can be justified by the need to complement the research and market portfolios, acquiring new competencies and attempting at exploiting economies of scope in R&D and marketing. Third, M&As might be triggered by declining competitiveness, exhaustion of the pipeline and expiration of patents on crucial products. Fourth, M&As can occur on rather conventional grounds for strategic purposes, e.g. to eliminate competitors. Fifth, mergers take place through vertical integration downstream, through the acquisition of distributors. Sixth, large corporations acquire producers of generics, either to preempt competition on their brand product in specific markets or to apply strategies of market segmentation, producing both the branded good at high prices and the generic version at lower prices.
searching randomly again for a new product everywhere in the space of molecules. Firms' growth will then depend on the number of drugs they have discovered (i.e. in diversification into different therapeutic categories), on the size and the growth of the markets they are present in, on the number of competitors, on the relative quality and price of their drug vis-à-vis competitors. In few cases, a firm can discover a blockbuster, i.e. a high quality drug that has a large and fast growing market.
Given the large number of therapeutic categories and the absence of any form of cumulativeness in the search and development process, no firm can hope to be able to win a large market share in the market, but -if anything -only in specific therapeutic categories for a limited period of time. As a result, the degree of concentration in the whole market for pharmaceuticals and in any individual therapeutic category will be low. However, a few firms will grow and become large, thanks essentially to the discovery of a "blockbuster" and to diversification. Under these conditions (absence of significant economies of scale and scope, independence across sub-markets), a skewed distribution of firms' size is likely to emerge.
The advent of "science" (i.e. molecular biology) starts to change this picture. In this version of the model we concentrate only on the "random screening" period. Malerba and Orsenigo (2002) develop a first, highly simplified, model of the advent of biotechnology.
Market structure, innovation, and the literature on industry life cycle
Our model relates to the literature on market structure and innovation and on industry life cycle. In our paper the industry is characterised by fragmented demand, firms focused on innovation and imitation processes, no economies of scope, limited cumulativeness of technical advance, quasi random search process by firms and systems of patent protection. As a result, the industry has a low overall level of concentration that is maintained during all of its evolution, but a much higher level of concentration in a single therapeutic area.
Our model has some similarities with Sutton's (1998) analysis of the pharmaceutical industry in the representation of the search process in the random screening period and also in the analysis of demand. However it differs from Sutton's model in some crucial assumptions about the opportunity conditions that characterise the industry. Moreover, unsurprisingly, we do not assume full rationality on the part of the agents nor do we pre-impose equilibrium conditions.
Our model could be also related to Klepper's model (2002) Given its aim and structure, our model of innovation, industrial dynamics and the evolution of pharmaceuticals allows us to examine some of the key issues in the debate of the analysis of market structure and innovation.
In our story (and in the simulation results that will follow), the industry reaches very early on and maintains over a long period of time low aggregate levels of concentration. would concentration evolve under different opportunity conditions, i.e. in environments where the probability of discovering a new products is higher or lower? d) appropriability conditions. As it is widely recognized, patents are crucial mechanisms for preventing imitation in pharmaceuticals. Yet, stronger patent protection implies lower competition and higher prices. In previous papers , Garavaglia et al. (2002) ), we began to explore the behaviour of the industry under alternative patent regimes. We found that an extension of patent duration lowers the number of surviving firms and increases the share of innovative firms and the average level of concentration in each therapeutic category, but not overall concentration. However the number of TC s discovered decreases and the total quality of the drugs in the market remains practically unchanged. In other words, stronger patent protection implies less exploration and less diversification for each firm. Finally, it is worth noting that, other things being equal, the effects of increased patent duration tend to have diminishing returns. Above certain minimum levels of protection, further increases have no effects at all. In this chapter, we develop further this stream of analysis by exploring the relationships between patent duration, opportunity conditions and size of demand.
The model
In this section we describe the basic functioning of the model. The industry is composed of many submarkets, called therapeutic category (TC). Each TC is characterised by a given number of potential customers (patients) and by a given spectrum of opportunities, represented by the number of molecules having a therapeutic and (therefore potential) commercial value. Molecules are scattered in the simulation environment and are grouped by TC according to their affinity to treat similar diseases. At the beginning of the simulation of the age of "random screening" a number of firms start to invest in random searches for promising molecules that might be the basis for the development of drugs useful in a particular TC. Some of them have chemical properties that can be exploited to develop a drug, others are useless. Firms that succeed in discovering one of the former obtain a patent on the molecule. Firms then start a project to develop the molecule into a marketable drug. Drug development takes time and resources. Development projects sometimes fail, because the quality of the drug turns out to be too low if compared to the minimum requirements legally needed (e.g. by the FDA) to be sold in the marketplace. When the project of a new drug is successfully developed and the drug meets the minimum legal requirements, it is commercialized.
During the phase of drug development, firms engage in marketing activities putting aside the marketing resources needed to launch the product. When the development of the drug is successfully completed, firms use this amount of resources to launch their product (the developed molecule) in the marketplace. Sales are influenced by the quality of the drug, by the firm's marketing efforts and by the price that is charged.
At the beginning, successful drugs in a particular TC face no competition but after some time other firms may discover and develop a competing drug in the same TC. Moreover, after patent expiration, imitations may occur. As a consequence of the competition from competing or imitative products, the market share and revenue of the original innovator is eroded.
By searching new promising molecules, firms may build a portfolio of patented molecules and they can choose to invest in several parallel projects of research for developing different drugs.
This choice is influenced by a) the firm's budget constraints, b) the attractiveness of the market (i.e.
the value of the actual revenues in the targeted therapeutic category), and c) degree of appropriability (i.e. the time remaining under patent protection for the drug to market). Thus, firms engage simultaneously in different projects and, as they discover and develop new products, they will progressively diversify into new TCs.
Profits coming from the sales of the drugs are reinvested in R&D and marketing. Firms' resources come from the commercialized drugs that assure the flows of revenues needed to invest in new projects. In the next sections, we describe in more detail the formal structure of the model.
The topography
The technological and market environment in which pharmaceutical firms are active is be unwilling to buy low quality drugs at the current price because of the presence of side effects.
Other things being equal, TCs having a larger number of patients tend to be more attractive for firms. In the model the economic value of each TC is endogenously determined by summing the revenues of each drug j sold at a given time-variable price (P j,t ). Therefore, even if the number of patients is exogenously given, the economic value of the TC changes during the simulation according to the monopolistic power stemming from to patents and the degree of competition among firms (approximated by the number of firms having a drug in the TC).
Within each TC there is a certain number of molecules Mol TC that firms aim to discover.
Each molecule has a certain quality Q, randomly set, drawn from a normal distribution (Figure 1 ). On average the probability of finding a "zero quality" molecule is equal to φ. On the other side, the complementary probability of finding a promising molecule with Q>0 is When a molecule is discovered a patent is granted and it is stored in a firm-specific portfolio of molecules available for future development projects. Patents have a specific duration, PD, and width, PW. That is to say, a patent prevents competitors from developing similar molecules located in the neighbourhood (spatial location represents the similarity) for PD simulation periods. Once the patent expires, the molecule becomes available for all firms, i.e. it is put it in a public portfolio shared by all the firms.
The firms
The industry is populated by an exogenously given number of potential firms, nF, which may possibly enter the market. Parameter nF is exogenous but it is calibrated with relation to the number of TCs (nTC) and the duration of the simulation (time). The choice of parameters nF, nTC and time has been taken according to a process of calibration of the model in order to avoid meaningless outcomes. The process of calibration is described in Appendix 2. Each potential entrant is endowed with a budget B start , equal for all firms. Firms have a limited understanding of the environment in which they act and behave, and follow simple, firm-specific rules of thumb (routines). Specifically, all firms engage in three activities: search, development (i.e. research activities) and marketing. In each simulation period, firms look for promising molecules and, if successful, start to develop the drug. If firms discover more than one promising molecule, they can decide to run multiple parallel projects of drug development. If the process of drug development is successful, firms actually enter the market and start marketing and selling the new drug.
Firms are heterogeneous: each firm is characterised by a different "strategy", or propensity, with regard to research and marketing activities. This propensity is quantitatively represented by a parameter, h, extracted from the uniform distribution. Consequently, firms invest a different amount of resources to each activity according to their propensity: for example some firms may want to spend more on search and development and less on marketing; other firms do the opposite. Thus, the firms' budget is divided each period among search, development and marketing activities as follows:
where ω is invariant and firm-specific.
Innovators and imitators. Firms are heterogeneous also for another reason: they can behave like innovators or imitators. On the one hand, firms that behave as innovators look for new molecules randomly screening the market environment and incurring a search cost. On the other hand, those firms that act as imitators select among the molecules whose patent has expired: imitators thus avoid the cost of search. Also, imitators benefit form another advantage sustaining a lower cost of drug development. In each period, firms' propensity (h) determines the imitation or innovation strategy followed by the firm according to a stochastic mechanism: if a firm has a propensity to research such that (1-h)>ψ t (where ψ t is a random number drawn from a uniform distribution ranging from 0 to 1), then the firm is temporarily an innovator. Otherwise, it will be temporarily an imitator. While the propensity to research (1-h) is given at the beginning of the simulation and does not change over time, ψ t does: as a consequence, firms with a very low propensity to research will most of the time be imitators, and conversely for innovators. Sometimes, no molecule is available for imitation: all discovered molecules are covered by patent protection. In this case imitators are forced to behave as innovators.
Innovative activities. Innovators look for new molecules by investing in a search process.
Search involves the payment of a fixed cost, (C s ), in order to draw a molecule from the space of available molecules. Thus, the number of molecules (X t ) drawn by a firm in each period is determined by the ratio between the fraction of the budget allocated to search, B s,t, and the cost C s :
Firms do not know the "height" (quality) Q of the molecule that they have drawn: they only know whether Q is greater than zero or not. If the molecule has a non-zero value and it has not been patented by others, then a patent for that molecule is obtained. The patented molecules become part of an individual 'portfolio' that each firm maintains for potential drug development.
Imitative activities. Imitative firms differ from innovative firms because they pick up -from a public portfolio -an already discovered molecule whose patent has expired 11 (instead of selecting randomly) without paying the cost of drawing. Imitators rate molecules to develop according to the same principle as innovator (see section below).
Development activities. Both innovator and imitator develop products from molecules by engaging in drug development activities. If the molecule is potentially interesting (i.e. it has a quality Q greater than zero), the firm starts a development project, using the budget allocated to this kind of activity, B D,t, to pay for the cost of development. The time and the cost necessary to complete a development project are assumed -for sake of simplicity -to be fixed and equal for all molecules and firms, the only difference being that both the cost (c) and the time spent ( revealed. Products must have a minimum quality, indicated with ν Q , to be allowed to be sold in the marketplace. In other words, products are subject to a "quality check" by an external agency (e.g. the FDA). In the simulations, the quality check threshold, ν Q , is set equal to the mean of the random distribution generating the quality of the molecules (µ Q = ν Q ). Below this value, the drug cannot be commercialized and the project fails.
When a product originates from a molecule which has never been used before, it is labelled as an innovative product, otherwise it is considered an imitative product.
In every simulation period, firms choose how many projects to start and which are the most promising molecules to develop. In other words, firms run parallel projects. The choice of how many projects to be conducted simultaneously and of the molecules to be developed is governed by some routines, described in Box 1.
11 The portfolio of molecules includes not only the molecules from which other firms generated a drug but also molecules not developed because firms fail or the molecules was not economically attractive.
12 More precisely, an imitative firm spends 1/3 of the money spent by an innovative firm to buy a step (step) of drug development. On the other hand the imitative firm buy each period two times the amount of step due to develop a drug. Even if the number of total step (TotStep) is equal for innovative and imitative, imitative are characterized by faster and cheaper development processes.
************************************************************************************************ Then, each molecule is associated with a variable (index i,t ) that determines its position in a ranking of attractiveness:
where Pstart i is the time t when patent of product i was granted.
Given the number newPr t of projects compatible with the budget constraint, the top ranked molecules are chosen and the newPr t related development projects are started. ************************************************************************************************ Marketing activities. After the process of development, and if the quality check is successful, firms launch their drugs on the marketplace. In order to get access to a larger number of patients, companies invest in marketing activities, which yield a certain level of "product image" for the consumers.
During the development of the product, a firm cumulates the resources needed for the later marketing investment by putting aside fractions of the total resources allocated to marketing, B M,t . These resources are remunerated by an interest rate r waiting for the end of the project and the consequent launch of the product. This "saving" process starts when the project is considered to be "promising", that is to say, the threshold of starting the accumulation of marketing resources for a product is the overcome of quality check. The hypothesis is that the firm, even if not knowing the real quality Q of the molecule until the end of the development process, during its investigation obtains some knowledge about the reached level of quality in a certain step of development.
The total budget devoted to marketing is split among the ongoing projects according to the higher average earnings of the related TC i of the project (avgEarnings i,t ) 13 .
The marketing expenditure, M t , is borne entirely at the launch of the drug at time t. They yield a certain level of "product image" for the consumers. This level of "image" is eroded with time at a rate equal to eA in each subsequent period, according to:
Demand and market shares. When a project i is completed and reaches the minimum quality requests, it becomes a product j sold on the market. In this model we assume that there is a constant unit cost of manufacturing and that each patient is assumed to buy one unit of the drug. Drugs are bought on the marketplace by groups of heterogeneous consumers. Decision to buy a drug depends on several factors, which together yield a specific "merit" to each j-th drug at time t. Formally, the value of this "merit", U j,t , is given by:
where:
Q j is the quality of the drug, M t the level of marketing "image" at time t, Price j,t is the level of price of drug j at time t defined by the firm according to a mark-up rule (see Box 2), exponents a, b and c are specific to each TC and drawn from uniform distributions (see Appendix). 13 In details, the accounting of marketing budget can be represented by the following steps: a) for each firm are considered the ongoing projects; b) If equation (1) is satisfied the project is considered promising and the marketing investment starts; Stept in equation (1) is the number of steps climbed at t and TotStep il the total amount of steps that have to be climbed. c) The firm distributes, among the promising projects, the amount of resources given to the marketing coming from the period earnings, given the propensity of the firm. d) the distribution is done according to the economic value of TA. Moreover, during the initial transitory period when firms have no products, the fixed share of 10% of the initial budget (B) is dedicated to marketing, afterwards the profits made period by period enrich the marketing budget according to the propensity of the firm. ************************************************************************************************ Box 2: firms' pricing strategy.
In the model, firms set a price according to a mark-up rule, as follows:
k are the costs of manufacturing, equal for all drugs, and mup j,t is the mark-up charged by firms. The mark-up is structured in order to take into account the competitive pressure in the market TC:
where Share f,t,TC is the market share of firm f, in terms of patients, in a given TC.
ε is the price elasticity of demand. ************************************************************************************************ The quality of the drug impacts on the diffusion among the patients. Intuitively, consumers of each TC are classified into four groups according to their propensity to buy low, medium-low, mediumhigh or high quality drugs (see Box 3). This structure is exogenously fixed and is equal for all the TCs: the lower border corresponds to the minimum quality level fixed by FDA to enter the market (µ Q ), while the upper limit to access the group of most demanding patients is exogenously fixed to three times more than the minimum threshold.
Therefore, low quality drugs will be in competition only for patients with the lowest request in terms of quality. On the other hand high quality drugs will be available for all patients. This stylized mechanism is a way to account for the heterogeneity of the demand, where some patients faces problems of side-effects and tolerability of the drugs. Moreover this way only high quality drugs are able to satisfy all the demand, even if there is only one firm in the TC. Other things being equal, the higher the share of patients the higher will be firm's sales, firm's market share and consequently the higher the mark-up and price. When new products enter the TC the price gradually (and endogenously) adjusts, decreasing according to γ and elasticity (ε) reaching a new equilibrium. ************************************************************************************************ Box 3: the structure of demand.
Each TC is characterized by a number of patients, Pat TC , divided in four groups (g) according to a different propensity to drugs' quality. Each group in composed by (Pat g =Pat TC ,/4) patients. Each patient in each given group buy a unit of drug only if the drug's quality satisfies a minimum requirement. We order the four groups from the less demanding to the most demanding, thus defining four quality thresholds. Thus, each product j, in a given TC, can be sold to a certain number of patients according to the number of quality thresholds overtaken. For example, given four thresholds products have the opportunity to reach from 1 to 4 groups (λ j ={1,2,3,4}). The product that overcome four thresholds (λ j =4) satisfies the quality requirement needed to be sold to all patients in a given TC.
More specifically, consumers of drug j at time t in the submarket TC are given by equation (12) 
where ∑ g U is the sum of the utilities of all products competing in the g groups of a given TC. To assess the market share of each product j in a TC we consider only the patients who are actually buying a product at time t. The best product in terms of quality, disclosure the opportunity of selling drugs to new groups of patients ( ĝ ). Equation (13) and (14) 
Sometimes, a firm may sell more then one product per TC. Equation (15) represents the whole number of patients of a firm f in a specific TC.
Finally, Share f,t,TC is the ratio between patients of the TC "caught" by the firm f (Pat f,t,TC ) and total number of patients in the TC that actually are buying a drug ( TC t g , ). This variable is determinant for the pricing decisions of the firms. ************************************************************************************************ Budget and accounting. Profits of firm f given by product j at time t are indicated by π f,j,t .
Because a firm f may have more than one product, total profits (∏ f,t ) are given by the sum of profits obtained from all the products of the firm, according to the following equation: where Pr f,t is the number of products belonging to firm f , k is the given cost of production, equal for all firms, and Price j,t is the price of product j. Pat j,t is the number of patients who buys the product j. In each period the profit, accumulated and divided into B S,t , B D,t and B M,t , is used to finance new expenditure in search, development and marketing for lunching new products. Moreover, we are assuming that the firm reinvests its whole budget, without paying dividends to shareholders. For reason of simplicity, we do not model the stock market behaviour.
Exit rules. Given that firms start new projects only if they have the sufficient budget to complete them (i.e. to complete the process of product development), it is impossible that firms run out of business by having a negative amount of money in their account. Our exit rules, then, relate to other mechanisms. There are three rules governing the firm's market exit.
First, if the number of draws per period in the search process is 0 more than n times (n=7) the firm fails. This rule aims at reflecting research inefficiencies.
The second rule states that when a firm without products' revenues do not have the minimum budget needed to complete one project it fails. This rule reflects financial difficulties of the firm.
Finally, firm exits when it has a total market share lower than χ (χ=0.4%). This reflects the unattractive position of the firm in the market. In the model there is also an exit rule at the product level: firms consider marginal a product that is purchased by a share of consumers lower than 5%, and consequently withdraw this product from the market.
The simulation runs

"History-friendly" runs
Our simulation runs (100 runs for each parameter setting) have basically two aims. First, we try to replicate some basic stylised features of the history of the pharmaceutical industry in the era of "random screening", in particular as it concerns industry concentration and patterns of competition, as suggested by the appreciative theory underlying our model. Second, we develop some theoretically-driven counterfactual exercises. In practice, we ask if history could have been different had the value of some key parameter taken alternative values.
The parameterisation used for our "history-friendly" simulations (see Appendix), henceforth called the Standard Set, reflects both some fundamental theoretical hypotheses and, in a highly qualitative way, some empirical evidence. The specification of the value of the parameters of the model includes also some strongly simplifying assumptions and reflects our ignorance about the "true" values of some key parameters. As a consequence, the Standard Set is broadly considered as "history-friendly" and it serves the purpose to produce a benchmark suggesting which changescoherent with our conceptual interpretation of the industry history -have to be introduced in the model in order to understand which mechanisms are able to mimic the evolution of the industry.
Thus, for example, in the Standard Set there are no economies of scale and no economies of scope and no processes of mergers and acquisitions. Even more important, there are no exogenous advances in knowledge that allow firms to focus their search activities and to increase the productivity of their research.
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The calibration of the model is the result of a process of repeated change in the parameters and methods of the model in order to obtain a satisfactory specification. Some parameters are selected on the basis of the knowledge we have about their meanings and values as shown by the empirical literature and the evidence provided by industry's specialists. The value of other parameters has been selected with the view to preserve coherence. In many cases, the parameterisation of some key variables of the model is largely ad hoc: we do not know the "real" distributions of the opportunities of discovery and we have only some rather generic knowledge about the economic value of the developed drugs.
In our model, the landscape explored by firms is rather rich in terms of opportunities of discovery, but the economic value of the discoveries of new products is highly skewed. Search, development and marketing activities are expensive and take time. The development of a drug takes respectively 8 and 4 years for innovative and imitative products. The desired rates of returns on investment are endogenously determined by the degree of competition in the market. Marketing expenditures have an important role in accessing a large number of customers.
The Standard Set
The results of the simulations based on the Standard Set are encouraging. In each submarket (TC), concentration (in terms of the Herfindahl index) tends to decrease quickly after an initial upsurge (Figure 2 ), reaching value of 0.3 at the end of the simulation runs. This pattern is due to the monopoly power of early entrants in each TC: gradually, after the introduction of new competitive innovative and imitative products in the same TC, the degree of competition rises and concentration decreases. Two main events are clearly observable in Figure 2 . Firstly, products enter the market after 8 periods of development: these products at the beginning are leaders of the TC, facing no other competition. Secondly, after 24 periods imitative products enter the market (i.e. patent duration lasts for 20 periods and 4 period-length is the minimum time spam needed in the simulation in order to develop an imitation).
Not surprisingly, given fragmentation in several submarkets, overall market concentration is always much lower than in individual therapeutic categories (Figure 3 ). It increases after period 50 as bigger firms -exploiting their larger financial resources -are able to enter new submarkets by finding and developing new products and imitating existing ones. However, this tendency is countered by the intrinsic randomness of innovation and by imitation. Thus, aggregate concentration remains relatively low, reaching a value of 0.23 at the end of the simulation. Selection is particularly intense in the first half of the simulation. Only 20 firms out of 50 potential entrants succeed in entering the market, because either they fail to discover promising molecules or they are unable to complete the development process (Figure 4 ). Other firms do succeed in entering the market but -for the same reasons as above as well as a result of the pressure of competition -they subsequently exit as the dynamics of the number of active firms in Figure 4 and the number of withdrawn products in Figure 5 indicate. The upsurge in the number of active firms, as shown in Figure 4 , around time 25 is a result of the process of entry of some imitative firms, after the first patents expired. As time goes by, though, the industry becomes more stable:
both entry and exit decrease and most of the survived firms tend to remain alive until the end of the simulation. Surviving firms own a portfolio of products and even though their market shares tend to decline in individual submarkets -leading in some cases to the withdrawal of products -they rely on the profits stemming from other drugs in other different TCs.
These broad dynamic trends result from significant heterogeneity across TCs: in a few TCs there are no firms, while in the others several firms are present. In an econometric exercise (not reported here) we found a positive and significant relationship between the number of firms in a TC and the dimension of the TC in terms of patients, supporting the idea that bigger markets attract more firms. Afterwards, as time goes by, imitation starts to take place: after the patents of the first set of innovative products expire imitation occurs frequently (Figure 6 ). Both the number of innovative and imitative products increase in absolute terms, but it is the share of imitative products on the total number of products that increases continuously over time, as a consequence of imitation. After 24 periods the growth rate of the number of innovative products slows down while imitative products begin to proliferate ( Figure 6 ). The possibility to engage in parallel research projects further strengthens imitative activities. However, innovative products are much more profitable than imitative ones along the whole simulation period, as suggested by the share of profits of innovative products equal to 70% of the profits of all products in the market, at the end of the simulation runs ( Figure 7 ). Furthermore, considered that innovation is not cumulative, since firms have always a small but positive probability to discover a blockbuster product, the leadership of the industry changes frequently: on average, the industry leader changes every 7 periods and the leader is always an innovator. In each TC there is an increasing number of products and firms (at the beginning only innovators, and then also imitators). At the end of the simulation runs, one observes on average 7 firms in each TC. However, the distribution of the number of firms (and products) in the TCs is quite skewed (Figure 8 ).
Also, firms increasing diversify into new TCs: the rate of discovery of new therapeutic categories is quite high in the first part of the runs, but then it slows down (Figure 9 ). At period 50, firms sell at least one product in more than 110 TCs out of the existing 200. This number then grows to 140 at period 100 as the number of unexplored therapeutic categories declines and as firms tend to crowd in the richest therapeutic categories. The decreasing rate of discovery is also correlated to the higher competitive pressure of imitative on innovative products: firms tend to select imitative drugs in large submarkets than developing new products in small therapeutic areas. As time goes by, the prices of drugs decrease (Figure 11 ).
The decline of prices of innovative products under patent protection is due to the higher degree of competition (the entry of competing innovative products in each TC) along the simulation time span. Thus, firms introducing new products in an already occupied TC are prevented from charging very high prices.
The decline in prices of products whose patent has expired is even more pronounced because of the fiercer competition they suffer from imitation.
Prices of imitative products, after an initial peak due to cases of duopoly between the first innovative incumbent and the second entrant, remain stable over time.
The patterns of average earnings for these typologies of products follow a similar dynamics (Figure 12 ). Thanks to the introduction of higher quality innovative products, the average number of patients in each TC that are willing to buy a drug (i.e. the number of patients firms are able to cure) increases. 
Counterfactuals: Empirically-and Theory-Driven Exercises
Empirical and Theoretical Questions about Market Concentration in the Pharmaceutical Industry
The Standard Set does a relatively good job in reproducing some of the stylised facts of the pharmaceutical industry: low and relatively stable concentration, strong competition between innovators and imitators, skewed size distribution of firms'.
In this section we follow a theoretically-driven route trying to modify the model parameterisation with the aim of answering some broad basic questions: which factors contribute to shape industry structure in pharmaceuticals? In particular, at what conditions could the pharmaceutical industry have become more concentrated than observed both in the simulations and in reality?
As discussed in Section 2, in the interpretation underlying the construction of our model, low degrees of concentration are the result of the combination of two main factors:
i) the nature of the search space and of the innovative process. In essence, innovation is not cumulative: past innovation does not increase a firm's probability to innovate again in the future.
Rather, innovation is basically described as a pure "lottery model" (Sutton, 1998) .
ii) The fragmented nature of markets. Innovation and the introduction of a drug into one sub-market do not influence the future ability to tap into different sub-markets, because products are not substitute to each other and because innovation does not exhibit economies of scope.
Furthermore, marketing expenditures for one particular product have no influence on the ability to penetrate and develop consumers' loyalty in a different therapeutic category.
The literature suggests also different, more traditional factors that might account for low levels of concentration.
iii) The first relates to the costs and to the existence of economies of scale in R&D. Indeed, the debate that took place during and after the Kefauver Committee (see Comanor, 1986; Scherer, 2000) emphasises the role that increasing costs of R&D might have produced on the ability to innovate and with regard to industrial concentration. Increasing R&D costs and the exploitation of scale economies in the discovery and development process are often indicated in the current debate as major factors that might drastically reshape the structure of the international pharmaceutical industry (fostering also processes of mergers and acquisitions). iv) A second important candidate to be looked at is the size and rate of growth of demand for drugs. There is little question that high rates of growth of demand sustained both the profitability and the innovativeness of the industry. But how would higher (lower) rates of demand growth have affected industrial concentration? One possible hypothesis is that higher rates of growth, by increasing profitability, might trigger higher R&D expenditures, higher innovation rates and -to the extent that innovation tends to increase concentration -also more concentrated industry structure. On the other hand, the effects of an increase of the size of the market(s) may depend critically on the nature of the innovative process and on the degree of fragmentation into independent sub-markets. As discussed by Sutton (Sutton, 1998) , growing market size may generate growing concentration if innovation is cumulative (past successful R&D increases the likelihood and the incentives to innovate again in the future) and it can be marketed into several sub-markets.
On the contrary, when innovation is not cumulative and the market is composed by several independent sub-markets, an increase in market size allows for the entry and survival of new firms, very much as in standard models of horizontal product differentiation.
Two further natural candidates are opportunity and appropriability conditions. v) How would market structure and innovation evolve in "richer" and "poorer" environments, i.e. where the probability of discovering a new promising molecule are higher (or lower?). For example, what would happen if basic research makes it possible to have access to molecules which could have not been previously discovered? On the one hand, higher opportunities might reduce concentration, making it easier for firms to find molecules and to introduce new products. Imitation becomes easier too. On the other hand, higher opportunities might increase concentration, to the extent that success-breeds-success processes favour the growth of the larger firms (even in the absence of cumulativeness in the search process) (Nelson and Winter, 1982) .
vi) As it concerns appropriability conditions, it is well known that pharmaceuticals are one of the few industries where patent protections is really important for preventing imitation and stimulating innovation. However, how tight the patent regime should be in order to attain high rates of innovation but also affordable prices for patients remains an open -and highly controversialissue. We shall deal at more length with the analysis of alternative patent regimes in Chapter X.
Here, we begin to explore the behaviour of the model under different simple assumptions about patent duration.
Costs and economies of scale (test factor iii)
We start by simply increasing research costs. We let the costs of search (cost of drawing new molecules) and development of the innovative and imitative firms to increase of 33%. Moreover, in order to assess the impact of the timing of costs rising, we let the increase occur at the beginning of the simulation (t=1), at t=30 and finally at t=60. We expect that the effect of the cost increasing is lower as time goes by due to a stronger financial stability of firms if compared to the beginning of the simulation.
The simulation runs show that the sooner the increasing of costs the stronger is the shakeout of firms in the industry (Figure 13a ). When the increment of costs occurs at t=1 fewer firms survive, with lower chances to grow. Aggregate concentration significantly rises only whether the increment of costs occurs at the beginning of the simulation. The average concentration in TC practically does not change: firms tend to enter in the richest discovered submarkets. The number of
TCs explored is consistently lower if compared to the standard set ( Figure 13b ). Since fewer drugs are launched in the market (Figure 13c and 13d), competition is milder and the prices of innovative products, especially those under patent protection, are higher.
To conclude, it seems that higher costs of research would affect more the fate of new entrants (Garavaglia et al., 2006) rather than industry structure. The results of this modification of the model are quite interesting. The number of firms declines slightly but their size increases significantly (both imitative and innovative firms). As a result, concentration rates increase both in each TC (on average) and even more so in the aggregate market ( Figure 14a and Figure 14b ). On the whole, however, the market remains competitive. Finally, given the higher rates of innovation, prices of innovative products under protection decrease (more innovative products compete with each other), while prices of innovative products, whose patent has expired and that have been imitated increase (imitation is penalized).
In conclusion, in our model, concentration depends positively on the level of both absolute costs and economies of scale effects in product development. Larger firms are able to translate their advantages stemming from cheaper product development into the discovery of new markets and products. However, increases in concentration are not dramatic.
The demand side: rate of growth of market size and market fragmentation (test factor ii and iv)
Next, we consider the role of demand, both as it concerns the role played by the rate of growth of the economic value of markets and the degree of fragmentation of sub-markets.
To begin with, we ran two series of simulations in which the rate of growth of demand is increased from 0% (the standard simulation) to 0.5% in each period. In the second, demand growth is set to 1% per period. Simulation results show that higher rates of growth of demand induce moderately higher degrees of concentration in the aggregate market as well as in each TC, as 30 compared to the Standard Set: larger demand allows firms to discover and develop more products and therefore to grow bigger. Indeed, the number of both innovative and imitative products increases significantly and the number of explored TC grows faster. However, more innovative products allow also for more imitation: overall concentration increases only slightly but (on average) in the TCs the concentration grows significantly (Figure 15a and 15b ). More innovation, however, induces tougher non-price competition, particularly at the expense of imitators. As in the previous case with economies of scale, the number of withdrawn products is significantly higher (in this case, twice as much as compared to the Standard Set). Also, the time sequence of prices is similar to the runs with scale economies. The prices of patented innovative products decrease (more innovative products compete with each other in any therapeutic category), while prices of innovative products, including also products whose patent has expired and that have been imitated increase (imitation pays proportionately less).
Let us now investigate the role of market fragmentation. Keeping the value of the aggregate market unchanged, we run simulations with 20 submarkets (TCs) and an extreme case with only one TC. In this latter setting, concentration raises substantially at the aggregate level from H=0.23 to H=0.94 (Figure 16a and 16b ). Competition is in principle more intense within each TC. After few periods, most submarkets are already crowded. Firms compete fiercely and prices decline. However, non-price competition is now relatively more important, because new drugs tend to cluster in the same (fewer) submarkets. Given that the exponent on (the inverse of) price is relatively low in the demand equation, imitative products are relatively penalised and many firms exit the market (in the case TC=20 only10 firms are in the market at the end of simulation). Thus, the price of patented drugs declines, while the prices of products whose patent has expired and of imitative products remains practically constant along the simulation period ( Figure 17 ). The opportunities to gain (temporary) monopoly power in new therapeutic categories are -by definition -constrained. Yet, the successbrings-success process allows a few successful firms to frequently discover, develop and launch new products, gaining significant market shares in most submarkets. Coupled with higher rates of exit, the aggregate outcome is higher overall concentration.
Innovative opportunities (test factor v)
We now focus on the properties of the search space.
We explore the simulation results with different settings of the distribution of opportunities.
We run simulations with different probabilities of finding a promising molecule in the search process, in order to start a new project (probability 1 -p in section 3.1.), comparing the Standard Set, where the probability of finding a "zero quality" molecule is p=0.97, with a simulation in which opportunities are richer (p=0.90) and with one where opportunities are poorer (p=0.99).
The results show that the higher the probability of finding promising molecules, the higher (but only slightly) the concentration in each TC, the lower the overall concentration (Figure 18a and   18b) , the higher the number of firms, the number of explored TCs, the number of innovative and imitative products, the size of innovative and imitative firms, and the lower the prices. Richer opportunities for innovation lead to more new drugs and more firms survive and grow. Imitation becomes also easier. Hence, within any TC, on the one hand, innovators can maintain higher market shares and prices and larger firms can grow more. On the other hand, easier innovation implies also stronger competition from other innovative drugs which drives prices down. Given that more TCs 
The role of patent protection (test factor vi)
We now turn to patent protection analyzing two settings. First, we run a simulation in which patent protection is granted for 40 periods (compared with 20 in the Standard Set). In this case more firms have a higher possibility to exert market control in each TC. Thus, concentration increases in individual TCs (Figures 19a and 19b ). However, while stronger patent protection strengthens innovative activity, imitating firms also benefit from this scenario because there are more products to imitate: both the number of innovative and imitative products increase (respectively about +70% and +23%). Also, firms explore more TCs (about +30%). As in the previous case of higher opportunities, aggregate concentration declines because more firms are active now in more submarkets. Higher innovation entails also fiercer competition among innovative products and prices tend be lower especially for innovative products under protection.
Second, as an extreme case, we investigate the effects of a patent protection granted only for 1 period (Figures 19a and 19b ). More firms survive, but they remain smaller in size, especially at it concerns innovators. Both concentration in each TC and overall concentration are lower than in the Standard Set. Prices are significantly lower in this case, prices of innovative products are only slightly higher than imitative (Figures 20a and 20b ). More significantly, the number of explored market is nearly 1/3 and the number of products in the market is half of the number of products in the standard simulation (Figures 21a and 21b ).
In this respect, the model reproduces the classic tradeoff: lower patent protection leads to lower prices but also to less innovation.
Moreover, these results suggest a more complex picture. First of all, the industry survives even with extremely low patent protection. Moreover the fiercer competition among innovative products when patents are granted for long time decrease the average prices of products under patent. Second, the behavior of innovation, prices and concentration is not linear as patent protection becomes stronger. The analysis becomes even more complex if the effects of tighter (weaker) patent regimes are examined in interaction with alternative opportunity and demand conditions We investigate these topics in Chapter X of this book.
Conclusions
The model does a good job in reproducing the main stylized facts which were the focus of our analysis. In particular, the industry is strongly competitive and it turns out to be quite hard to have a substantial increase in concentration even if we introduce in the model setting higher research costs, economies of scale, different demand and opportunity conditions, tighter patenting regimes. In the absence of cumulativeness in innovation and given the fragmented nature of the market, the pharmaceutical industry appears to be naturally competitive.
TO BE COMPLETED
Parameters and variables
Parameters and Variables Symbol Value
Total profits of firm f in period t ∏f,t
Exponent of product quality (PQ) (see Utility function [eq. (8) 
